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ABSTRACT 
Interest rates are fundamental in the explanation of equilibrium prices over time, 
because they provide the link between the present and the future. Capturing this 
dynamic feature, the overlapping generations model is particularly suitable to address 
the interest rate problem, as has been shown by Paul Samuelson, David Gale and 
Costas Azariadis. 
This thesis reviews their contribution to the theory of interest: with his consumption-
loan model, Samuelson sets the analytical framework for subsequent research. 
Furthermore, he demonstrates that the optimal interest rate is unstable, implying that a 
competitive economy may fail to approach the social optimum. The Samuelson and 
classical sets of assumptions are consolidated in the intertemporal exchange model of 
Gale. Its equilibrium nature, however, ignores the sequential adjustment of 
disequilibrium interest rates to their equilibrium values. Consequently it is difficult to 
comment on the direction of causality involved in the interest rate determination, 
unless a clearing house is introduced which simultaneously resolves the starting-up, 
continuity and causality problems. 
Departing from the full certainty scenano, Azariadis analyses the existence and 
likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies. It is shown that the implications of the 
economy's assumed Markovian structure are twofold: while facilitating the parametric 
treatment of the transition probabilities, it negates the question concerning the 
likelihood of sunspot equilibria. Within the specified framework it is impossible to 
explain how the economy arrives at such equilibria; it is only possible to identify the 
conditions that maintain (once they exist) these self-fulfilling prophecies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest rates provide the link between present and future prices, they are, therefore, 
fundamental when explaining the evolution of equilibrium prices. In addition, the 
inverse relationship between interest rates and consumption levels (given certain 
assumptions), implies that changing intertemporal prices translate to business cycles. 
With these two intertwined issues in mind, this paper sets out to critically review a 
selection of the major articles that investigate the determinants of interest rates and 
consumption levels over time. 
Reviewing the economic literature on interest rates, it is clear that, at the tum of the 
century, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk dominated the theory of capital and interest with 
his "agio" theory. Having taken a grand equilibrium approach, he separated capitalists 
and entrepreneurs into lenders and borrowers in an aggregate capital market where 
present goods would be exchanged for future ones. Supply and demand forces in this 
intertemporal market, Bohm-Bawerk maintained, establish a systematic premium on 
present goods vis-a-vis future goods. The particular causes that Bohm-Bawerk 
adduced for the positivity of the rate of interest include two psychological reasons: that 
agents typically expect to be better off in the future, and that they typically do not feel 
future wants as intensely as present ones. A third reason postulated stems from his 
belief that Nature's time-consuming methods are more productive, i.e., the sustainable 
yield of renewable resources is represented as a compound rate, establishing the 
technological superiority of present over future goods (Brems 1988, Samuelson 1967). 
The market rate of interest is thus determined, on one hand, by intertemporal consumer 
behaviour as based on preferences and expected incomes; and on the other hand, by 
producer behaviour as based on the intertemporal structure of roundabout methods of 
production. 
Bohm-Bawerk's analysis was taken up by Irving Fisher and developed into the 
"impatience and opportunity" theory. By extending Walras's general equilibrium theory 
to include intertemporal choices and relationships, while simultaneously simplifying it 
by considering an aggregate commodity, Fisher succeeded in presenting a "definitive 
model of general equilibrium determination of interest rates" (Samuelson 1967, p.30), 
presenting insights into the problem of intertemporal allocation not offered by his 
predecessors. 
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The Fisher theory of interest is based on the notions of time preference and investment 
opportunities. Fisher advocates impatience as an explanation of interest and believes 
that, in a stationary equilibrium, consumers will require positive interest; and that only 
those technologies and investment opportunities affording a net rate of return at least 
equal to this pure time preference rate would be used (Tobin 1987). 
Another milestone in the history of the theory of interest was reached by Paul 
Samuelson in 1958. With his famous consumption-loans model he was the first to 
capture the essential point that finite lived individuals exist in an infinitely lived 
economy, and thus to address the interest rate problem in a dynamic population model. 
In his exposition, he raises some fundamental questions, such as the multiplicity of 
stationary equilibrium rates and their stability properties. The interest rates that he 
derives in a competitive economy can be negative - in contrast to the classicals like 
Bohm-Bawerk and Fisher. This observation led David Gale (1973) to consolidate the 
opposing sets of assumptions in a single model; through which he could expose the 
qualitative differences between the two approaches to the interest rate problem. In 
particular, he considers their implications for the stationary and nonstationary 
behaviour of the model. 
Departing from the full certainty scenario, Costas Azariadis (1981) investigates the 
emergence of business cycles caused merely by subjective beliefs. He argues that even 
in a world in which uncertainty is excluded from the structural components of the 
economy, agents may take actions which tend to bear out their expectations. Azariadis 
is mainly concerned with the likelihood of these self-fulfilling prophecies, but it will be 
argued that the assumed Markovian structure of this model prevents him from doing 
so. 
This thesis is broadly structured as follows: chapter one introduces the general 
overlapping generations framework that is used to discuss the selected articles. 
Chapter two will briefly familiarise the reader with Samuelson's analysis of the interest 
rate problem, summarising the main questions raised. The third chapter is concerned 
with Gale's generalisation of Samuelson's framework. It is in two sections, the first 
delineating the main issues addressed by Gale, the second offering a critical review of 
his argument. Chapter four examines the impact of uncertainty on the model. In section 
one we outline Azariadis's model and elucidate the concept of extraneous uncertainty. 
The second part of chapter four highlights some of its shortcomings, inconsistencies 
and redundancies. The main findings are then summarised in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
THE GENERAL MODEL 
The papers by Samuelson, Gale and Azariadis mentioned above will be discussed 
within the general framework of an overlapping generations model without bequests. 
We divide every agent's life into J distinct periods of equal length, where J takes on any 
positive integer value. The number of people that are born at the beginning of a period 
is denoted by N 1, and the number of people who die at the end of the period by N 1. 
There are thus N~ members of age j = 1, . . . , J alive in any time period t. 
Each agent receives an exogenous endowment ej in thejth period oflife (j = 1, . .. , J). 
This endowment can be interpreted as labour endowment which enables the individual 
to produce output. Due to the assumptions that only one good is produced, and that 
all agents are identical and hence have access to the same technology, these 
endowments can be expressed as units of the good produced. Throughout the paper 
we will deal with endowments and keep production implicit, i.e. focus on pure 
exchange rather than productive models, and hence concentrate on the theory of 
interest rather than the theory of capital1. 
The number of goods consumed by an individual of age j in period t is given by c~. For 
all generations the representative agent's preferences are given by a smooth monotone, 
concave utility function V(c1, ... , c1) . Hence any trade that occurs is reflected by the 
divergence of the lifetime consumption pattern c = { c~, . . . , c~+J-I) from the 
endowment vector e = ( e1, . . . , e1). Noting that both, the utility function and the 
endowment vector remain invariant over time, consumption levels may change over 
time in accordance with changing prices. The fact that we are dealing with a single 
good economy enables us to focus on intertemporal preferences that cause price 
changes over time, as reflected by the interest rate ri, or equivalently, by the interest 
factor Pt = 1 + rt = Pt I Pt + 1. The product is assumed completely perishable and must 
therefore be consumed in the period of its production. Consequently, it can serve 
l Historically, the theory of interest was developed in the context of relative prices, while the classics 
developed the theory of capital in the context of reproduction: whereas the former was designed to 
explain the exchange of wealth of the individuals with the interest rate as the price relating to the 
intertemporal exchange of wealth, the latter centered on the explanation of the growth of the wealth 
of nations (Meacci 1989). 
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neither as a store of value nor as a medium of exchange; in due course (section 3.2.3) 
other candidates for these purposes will be considered. 
Having fixed the notation, general consumer behaviour can be defined formally. At the 
beginning of his life the individual maximises lifetime utility V(c1, ... , c1) subject to 
his budget constraint; which requires simply that his total compounded lifetime 
consumption must equal total compounded lifetime endowment, 
J [ J-1 ] """" TI P. {c~+j-1 - e1+j-1) = 0 £...- t+k- 1 J J 
j=I k=j 
[LA] 
where, by convention, p1 + i . 1 = 1 if j > J - 1. 
Alternatively, total compounded excess demands z = c - e must be zero ( or, 
equivalently, total net savings s = e - c must be zero), i.e., 
for any given t. 
The corresponding Lagrange function yields the first order conditions 
J-1 
vj + A TI Pt+k- 1 - o 
k=j 
v't = 1, . .. , J (J equations) 
[LA'] 
[1.B'] 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier, and Vi denotes the partial derivative of V with 
respect to cj, i.e., Vi refers to the marginal utility of consumption at time t + j + 1 
when the consumer is of age j. Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, this set of J 
equations can now be reduced by one equation to read 
v't = 1, . .. , J - 1 (J - 1 equations). [1.B] 
These equalities clearly state that the individual is in equilibrium if in every period of 
his life the marginal rate of subjective intertemporal substitution coincides with the 
corresponding intertemporal price. For parametric interest rates we can derive the 
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demand functions c~(p1, .. . , p1 + 1 • 2) and hence the corresponding excess demand 
z~(Pv ... , P1+ 1 • 2) or savings functions s~(p1, ... , P1+ 1 • 2) . 
In addition to the budget constraint that each individual faces, the population as a 
whole is constrained by the market clearing condition which requires that in every 
time period t aggregate consumption equals aggregate endowment2. Consider a 
population that grows geometrically at a constant rate y and suppose that at time t 
there are N ~ members in their last period of life. Then the demographic structure 
implies that there will be y N~ members of age J - 1, or in general, y 1 • j N ~ people in 
their jth period of life. Remembering that the utility function is representative and 
remains invariant over time, the market clearing condition can be obtained by summing 
all excess demands of all population members that are alive in period t. That means 
J 
L ( y r-j N~ z~ (pt> ... ' Pt+J-2 ) = 0 Vt. [l .C] 
j=I 
We can now define a short run equilibrium as an element of the sequence { c }1 of 
consumption vectors that satisfies simultaneously the individual budget constraint 
[1.A] and the feasibility condition [1.C] for a given period t. A stationary (or long 
run) equilibrium, by contrast, is characterised by a constant sequence {ch where the 
equilibrium consumption pattern and hence also the corresponding interest factor p are 
time independent, i.e., their values remain invariant over time. 
Let us now tum to the papers by Samuelson, Gale, and Azariadis to consider their use 
of the above model, the alterations they made to it, and the results and inferences they 
finally obtained. 
2 Recall that real investment is impossible because the good is perishable. 
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Chapter 2 
SAMUELSON'S CONSUMPTION-LOAN MODEL 
In his article "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without Social 
Contrivance of Money" Samuelson (1958) considers successive generations of agents 
who enter the labour market, work for about forty-five years and then retire. Not 
having a social security system, these people want to save during their working years 
to provide for a retirement during which they will not earn any income. This desired 
saving pattern could easily be realised, if the good produced were durable. His 
question is how these agents will provide for their old age given that the good is 
perfectly perishable and thus cannot be carried over from one period to the next? 
2.1) The Model 
To formulate the problem, Samuelson makes some simplifying assumptions: all agents 
of all generations are identical except, of course, for their birth dates. In particular, a 
representative agent's life is divided into three periods - two productive ones during 
each of which the exogenously given labour endowment enables him to produce one 
unit of the good; followed by a non-productive retirement period without any 
endowment3. The agents' utility function V(c1, c2, c3) does not assume any systematic 
subjective time preference. In addition, the demographic structure is restricted to a 
population that grows geometrically at a constant rate y, where a stationary population 
corresponds to a zero growth rate (y = 1). Thus at any point in time the young and 
middle-aged outnumber the old by the fixed proportions y2: 1 and y: 1, respectively. 
Given these assumptions, what will be the intertemporal terms of trade in a perfect 
capital market under perfect certainty? In other words, which equilibrium levels of the 
interest factors p1 for any time t will clear the market for present and future 
consumption? 
For this purpose we should clearly delineate the agents' behaviour and the constraints 
they face individually and collectively. Referring to the general framework of the 
3 Contrary to our general specifications outlined in the introduction, Samuelson considers the special 
case where ~ = 0. 
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overlapping generations model outlined in chapter one, we can now easily derive the 
constraints that are relevant in Samuelson's setup. We simply substitute the number of 
generations that are alive at any point in time (J = 3) and the lifetime endowment 
vector of each individual e = (e1, e2, ~) = (1, 1, 0) to obtain the individual budget 
constraint 
Pt Pt+t ( c: -1) + Pt+t ( c~+i -1) + ( ct2 - 0) = 0 [2.A] 
or, in terms of individual net savings, 
[2.A'] 
Similarly, the market clearing condition now becomes 
where N refers to the number of retired consumers in period t. The population is 
homogenous, therefore dividing by N one obtains this condition as 
\ft. [2.C'] 
These two equations, however, pose a very difficult problem as the market clearing 
condition for each period contains past, current and future interest factors, leaving us 
with more unknowns than equations. Extending the time period under consideration to 
any finite length will not resolve the problem, because this process adds as many 
unknowns as it adds equations. Thus, to define an equilibrium path of interest rates we 
have to determine all interest rates between the present and the infinitely far future. To 
sidestep this "planning-until-infinity" problem, Samuelson assumes a constant interest 
factor p for all periods. The obvious mathematical solution satisfying both the 
stationary budget constraint 
[2.A*] 
and a stationary market clearing condition 
[2.C*] 
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would be an interest factor equal to the biological growth rate (p = y) and, 
correspondingly, an interest rate r = y - 1. Thus a growing population would have a 
positive equilibrium interest rate, a decaying one a negative rate of interest. 
Samuelson demonstrates that this outcome represents the "optimal" interest factor in 
both, the constant and the growing population, in the sense that it is a solution to the 
constrained utility maximisation problem. It does not matter, whether we formulate the 
optimality conjecture in terms of lifetime utility of the representative agent or in terms 
of the current utility of a cross-sectional family, since the fixed proportion y2:y: 1 of 
such a family's age distribution ensures that the one utility function is a monotonic 
transform of the other. Consequently, the two maximisation problems must yield the 
same results, implying that the intertemporal choice problem can be condensed to a 
one-period problem. 
2.2) Common Sense Explanations 
Samuelson looks for heuristic explanations of his result: every agent of each generation 
shares the same characteristics except, of course, for the birth date. Thus, any 
hypothetical transfer through time is essentially a trade with a member of another 
generation, which, in a stationary population (y = 1) is a one-to-one physical transfer, 
implying a zero interest rate. In a growing population, where the age distribution is 
skewed in favour of the younger productive ages (y > 1), total production increases 
along with the population size. This increased production allows the old to enjoy 
higher consumption levels compared to the stationary state, because there are more 
workers to support them, explaining the positive interest rate. 
The above explanation is rendered not convincing by the premise that voluntary trade 
will only take place if mutually beneficial. Without altruism, social security or any store 
of value, the old have no claims on the young. Agents must therefore provide for their 
own retirement while being middle-aged by passing some consumption goods on to the 
young in return for consumption in the following period. This forces them to consume 
in excess of their endowment while young ( c1 > 1 or s1 < 0) and to save in only one 
period of their life, namely when they are middle-aged (Si > 0). The resulting "hump 
saving" pattern, however, is incompatible with Samuelson's assumption of no 
systematic subjective time preference. At the interest factor p = 1, the latter 
assumption would prescribe equal consumption levels for each of the three periods 
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(cj = 213 for j = 1, 2, 3), implying that the endeavour to save is spread over both 
productive periods. But the young are unable to save, because there are no suitable 
trading partners with whom they can enter an intertemporal trade agreement: neither 
the middle-aged nor the old will be able to repay at a future date, either because they 
are old and hence without any endowment, or because they do not live anymore. In 
this scenario, market forces will clearly not bring about the optimal interest rate 
(p = y = 1 ). This inconsistency of the common sense explanation and the impeccable 
mathematical solution suggests that the equilibrium equations have multiple solutions. 
In particular, if we assume that the model starts at the beginning of biological time, the 
biological rate of interest will never emerge in the free market although it satisfies the 
optimality conjecture (Samuelson's "impossibility theorem"). 
To delineate the paradox more clearly Samuelson considers the two-generation case4 
where only the young produce, the old retire. Intergenerational trade cannot take place 
because no two potential trading partners of different generations both live for two 
consecutive _time periods, implying that quid pro quo, or in fact any mutual exchange, 
is impossible. The interest factor is thus indeterminate, yet the corresponding 
mathematics allows for p = y as a solution. Even if we adopt a multilateral view of 
trade, for example in the stationary three-generation model, positive savings of the 
young at an interest factor equal to 1 is logically impossible. In the absence of any 
systematic time preference, the social optimum configuration (p = y) can never be 
reached by the competitive market, or even be approached over time. Samuelson 
provides a numerical example to confirm this instability of the biological interest rate 
by deriving a negative value for the actual competitive market rate of interest that 
would reflect the cost that agents must bear to bribe other generations to provide for 
their retirement. He concludes that in the stationary population case a negative market 
interest rate will obtain rather than the biological zero interest rate that corresponds to 
the social optimum. And in the general case, where the population changes ( y -:;; 1 ), the 
competitive market rate will be below the biological rate of interest (Pm < y). 
Increasing the productive years relative to the retirement years will narrow down the 
differential as the optimal rate y is approached from below. Note, that the market 
interest rates converge to the competitive equilibrium rate over time ( and remain at 
that level forever after), implying that the latter ensures the stability of the system 
- which the biological rate of interest fails to do. 
4 By introducing an overlap between workers of different ages, the three-period model is essentially 
equivalent to a general n-period model, and thus very different from the two-period case. 
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According to Samuelson, legislating social security will enable society as a whole to 
attain the social optimum if, by law, the young are assured of their retirement 
subsistence, provided they support the currently old. Insofar as such a contract is 
binding for the yet unborn, the young will overcome their reluctance to give part of 
their endowment to the old who will never be able to return it. Consequently 
everybody, including the currently young will be better off, since they will be on the 
receiving end when old. The optimal unstable equilibrium has thus become stable by 
decree. 
Alternatively, we could introduce fiat money as a medium of exchange and a store of 
value. Then money earned during the productive years would give the agents a claim 
on workers of subsequent time periods even though no real compensation is possible. 
Samuelson concludes with the conjecture that a constant total money stock might lead 
to the socially optimal interest factory, with prices falling at a rate 1/y. Thus money 
itself can serve as a social contract. 
In concluding this chapter let us highlight the important contribution of Samuelson's 
paper. Not only does he point to some difficulties we do encounter when determining 
the equilibrium path of interest rates, but he also reveals a fundamental deficiency 
inherent in the free pricing system: assuming no systematic time preference a "hump 
saving" pattern will emerge, and the implied stationary equilibrium interest rate is 
below the optimal biological rate of interest. The instability of the latter thus indicates 
that the competitive economy approaches the suboptimal outcomes, where individuals 
fail to attain the maximum level of utility that were possible under the biological 
interest rate. The simultaneous actions of self-interested individuals do not 
(necessarily) ensure the attaining of a social optimum and some kind of social collusion 
is necessary for this purpose. 
These results have paved the way for further research in the determination of interest 
rates and the role of money as an optimal store of wealth. The following chapter 
focuses on the determination of interest rates following Gale's (1973) article "Pure 
Exchange Equilibrium of Dynamic Economic Models". 
s Samuelson argues that the competitive outcome is situated on the Pareto-efficiency frontier but is not 
ethically optimal in terms of a social welfare function. Gale later refutes its Pareto optimality and 
Malinvaud (1985) demonstrates that "in the overlapping generations model, statioruuy competitive 
equilibria may exist that are not Pareto efficient" (p.311 ). 
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Chapter3 
GALE'S PURE EXCHANGE MODELS 
Like Samuelson, Gale (1973) studies the competitive equilibria over time of a one 
good, pure exchange model within the overlapping generations framework, but 
attempts a more general analysis of the interest rate determination problem. In 
particular, he observes that the assumptions that led earlier writers (Bohm-Bawerk, 
Fisher) to postulate positive interest rates, are directly opposite to Samuelson's 
assumptions which give rise to negative rates of interest. 
To clarify this dichotomy, let us briefly review the classical theory of interest. The 
general equilibrium solution of a pure intertemporal trade problem, where agents 
exchange the incomes of various periods of their lives, determines the interest rate in 
each period. In general, income is highly desired during the agents' youth due to the 
impatience to spend income and due to the opportunity to invest it. However, people 
are assumed to receive more income towards the later years of their lives, emphasising 
the scarcity of income during youth. This scenario induces individuals to shift part of 
their income stream towards the early years of their lives, explaining why interest rates 
should be positive. 
Samuelson, by contrast, rules out both, systematic time preference and the opportunity 
to invest income. Moreover, he does not grant his agents any income in their old age. 
The two cases are thus based on opposing assumptions and should therefore be 
expected to display fundamentally different results. 
Let us now consider Gale's intertemporal exchange model which encompasses both the 
worlds of the classics and of Samuelson. We shall see how it exposes the qualitative 
differences of the underlying assumptions and their implications for both stationary 
equilibria and for the nonsteady state behaviour in the two models. 
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3.1} THE MODEL 
Gale uses the general structure of the overlapping generations model as delineated in 
the first chapter, but confines his analysis to the two-generation case (J = 2) where 
each agent lives for two periods only. As before constant population growth, only one 
perishable good and no store of value are assumed. It is also assumed that agents of all 
generations receive the same income stream over time as specified by the lifetime 
endowment vector e = (e1, e2) . At the beginning of his life, the representative 
individual maximises lifetime utility V(c) = v(c:, c~+t) subject to the budget 
constraint 
[3.A] 
where savings earn interest p1 - 1. Corresponding to the set of optimality conditions 
[l .B] a single first order condition that equates the interest factor with the individual's 
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, is now obtained: 
[3.B] 
Upon substitution, Gale is able to summarise the individual's behaviour by the so-called 
offer curve 
[3 .D] 
This curve depicts all consumption patterns at which the individual is in equilibrium. 
Each combination of c1 and c2 corresponds to a unique interest rate as implied by the 
first order condition [3 .B]. The ability of all individuals to simultaneously attain a 
personal equilibrium depends on the total resources available to society as given by the 
market clearing condition corresponding to [l.C], 
[3.C] 
Any equilibrium programme of the sequence {ch must satisfy both, the individual 
budget constraint [3 .A] and the market clearing condition [3 .C], i.e., it must be both 
competitive and feasible - in Gale's terminology. 
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3.1.1) Stationary Equilibria 
Parallel to Samuelson's treatment of the interest rate problem, Gale first considers 
stationary equilibria where both the consumption level c and hence the interest factor p 
are constant over time. The stationary equivalents of the individual and aggregate 
budget constraints [3.A] and [3 .C] are given by 
and 
p [ e1 - c1 ] + [ e2 - c2 ] = 0 
y [ e1 - c1 ] + [ e2 - c2 ] = 0 . 
The resulting equilibrium condition 




thus requires either that the interest factor is equal to the population growth rate 
(p = y), or that no trade occurs (e1 = c1) . Consequently, a steady state equilibrium must 
be either a golden rule ( or optimal) programme where the biological interest rate 
obtains, or a balanced programme in which there is no trade between generations and 
hence everybody consumes according to the given endowment pattern. Gale deduces 
that, without using the preference ordering "there are at most two possible steady state 
equilibria" (p.19). However, one needs to incorporate preferences to detennine a 
unique consumption level in the golden rule case, as the condition p = y implies that 
the individual budget and the feasibility constraints coincide. Hence they are 
simultaneously satisfied for an infinite number of points on this line, allowing for 
infinitely many (not only two) steady state equilibria. This inconsistency can easily be 
resolved by introducing preferences6 to detennine the unique optimal stationary 
equilibrium c•. 
6 Gale in fact refers to revealed preferences in proving his theorem (p.19). 
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In his attempt to examine the sign of interest rates in general, Gale clearly distinguishes 
between the classical and the Samuelson cases: 
1) In the classical model people are impatient in the sense that they want to 
consume in excess of their endo.wment when young, i.e., c: > e1. Equivalently, 
the interest factor associated with the no trade equilibrium, p , exceeds the 
population growth rate, i.e., p > y. Thus a constant population size accords with 
positive interest rates7: 
f>=l+r>y=l r >O. 
2) The Samuelson case refers to the opposite scenario where agents save in their 
youth, i.e., c: < e1, or equivalently p < y, implying negative subjective interest 
rates, r < 0. This is a slight generalisation of Samuelson's (1958) original model 
which involves the extreme value of e2 = 0. 
The distinction between these two cases is important when considering the Pareto 
optimality of stationary states. Gale claims in his theorem 3 (p.21) that the "no trade 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal in the classical case and not in the Samuelson case. "8 Let 
us examine the second part of the statement: if, as Samuelson suggests, the young 
consume c; < e1 instead of e1, the utility they derive in this period is lessened, 
( v( c:, e2 ) < V( e1, e2 ) with c2 = e2 constant), implying that they are worse off in their 
youth. Focusing on lifetime utility, however, c• is preferred to e as indicated by a 
higher indifference curve (Fig.D). Hence, if agents realise c; when old, the sacrifice 
during their youth is overcompensated in their old age. 
3.1.2) Stability of N onstationary Programmes 
Let us now investigate the nonsteady behaviour of the models, in particular their 
stability. Starting from given initial conditions, will the economy approach a stationary 
equilibrium, and if so, which one? 
7 The interest factor p and the corresponding interest rate r should be interpreted as the subjective 
interest factor and interest rate, respectively, as determined by the slope of the indifference curve 
through e, since no interest rates can be determined if no trade occurs (Fig.D). 
8 Note that c• is Pareto optimal in both cases. 
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Recall that the offer curve is a function of an individual's equilibrium consumption 
levels, c: and ct1, over two consecutive time periods, while the market clearing 
constraint is a function of the consumption levels c: and c~ of two different 
generations in the same time period. Assuming that we can solve the former for ct, 
we can rearrange equations [3.D] and [3.C] to obtain 
ct+1 - f [c1] 2 - I 
and 
The resulting composite function 




clearly gives successive values of consumption by the old over time and thus shows 
how the consumption levels of one generation depend on those of preceding 
generations. For any given initial value c~ 
these equations completely determine the 
consumption patterns for all future 
generations9, and in view of the individuals' 
budget constraints [3.A] also the 
corresponding interest rates. Using Fig.A we 
can easily trace out the time path that 





consumption programmes: starting with an J32 
initial value of c~ the corresponding c~ value 
is given by [3 .C'], i.e., by a horizontal arrow 
towards the market clearing line. Proceeding 
Fig. A 
in a vertical direction until the offer curve is reached (with the exact value given by 
[3 .D']), the subsequent consumption level c~ can be read off the graph. 
The model's behaviour is sensitive to the initial value of c~. Denoting the two 
stationary equilibria at the points of intersection by a and 13, we can observe that any 
initial value c~ between o.i and f32 gives rise to a time path that moves away from a 
and towards '3. For any starting point c~ < f32, the time path will also approach 13; but if 
c~ > o.i the resulting time path will explode, illustrating a kind of breakdown of the 
9 Note that Samuelson has remarked on this planning-until-infinity issue already. 
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economy. Consequently, a is unstable, p is locally stable. In the classical case a = e 
and p = c*, implying that the balanced programme is unstable and the golden rule 
programme is locally stable. The opposite can be observed in the Samuelson model 
where a = c* and p = e. Hence we get the paradoxical result that the Pareto preferred 
golden rule equilibrium is unstable while the Pareto suboptimal no trade equilibrium is 
stable. 
Fig.B 
Note that the monotonic convergence to p 
requires that the offer curve is negatively 
sloped everywhere. Gale gives an example 
(using a quadratic utility function) to show 
the emergence of business cycles under 
perfect foresight. Such an oscillation 
between two lifetime consumption vectors 
c+ and c· is illustrated in Fig.B. While this 
scenario requires that the offer curve is 
upward sloping at P, a positive slope will 
not guarantee a stable limit cycle. Loosely 
speaking, a fairly flat, yet upward sloping, offer curve will maintain the local stability of 
J}; but convergence will be nonmonotonic. If the offer curve gets steeper at P, the 
equilibrium point becomes unstable and the time path exhibits a two-period cycle 
(Fig.B). Further increases in the steepness of the offer curve will produce cycles of 
increasing periodicity, and eventually an aperiodic time path (exhibiting chaos). The 
exact specifications that distinguish among stationary equilibria, periodic and aperiodic 
cycles, however, do not fall under the scope of this paper10. 
10 The interested reader may refer to the literature on chaos theory, inter alia Butler (1990), Day 
(1982) and Rosser (1990). 
3.2) COMMENTS 
3.2.1) Systematic Time Preference 
It is often held that the interest rate 
expresses the intensity of preference for 
present over future consumption, but this 
relationship can be more complex. To 
avoid any confusion, let us define 
systematic time preference and clarify the 
distinction between the classical and the 
Samuelson models. As used by Gale, the 
dichotomy between the two cases 
depends on the distribution of lifetime 
endowment relative to the individual's Fig. C 




systematic time preference per se. According to Malinvaud's (1985) definition of 
impatience, however, the latter notion refers to systematic preference for the present 
over the future in the sense that at any point on the line c1 = c2 the indifference curve 









Following this definition all possibilities are 
illustrated in Fig. C and listed in the table, where 11 
denotes the absolute value of the indifference 
curve's slope on the 45° line. 
Given agent preferences and the population growth rate, whether the classical and 
Samuelson case arises depends on the position of the endowment vector relative to the 
desired lifetime consumption pattern: thus, depicted graphically (Fig.D), whenever the 
desired level of consumption c; is approached from above (i.e. when e is situated 
somewhere on the bold section of the market clearing constraint) we are dealing with 
the Samuelson case - irrespective of any systematic time preference. 
Although positive interest rates are usually 
associated with impatient preferences11 we 
can show for example the Samuelson model 
exhibiting negative subjective interest rates 
r (p < 1) compatible with systematic 
preference for present consumption a la 
Malinvaud as illustrated in Fig.D. 
Thus Samuelson's statement that, "nothing is 
said about whether, subjectively, men 
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Fig.D 
or satisfactions" implying that he is "ignoring Bohm's second cause of systematic time 
preference" (p.469), while compatible with Malinvaud's definition, is contradicted if 
systematic time preference is defined in terms of the value p takes on relative to y. In 
the sequel we shall use the terms impatient and patient to indicate that TJ > 1 and 
TJ < 1, respectively, independently of the value taken by Yr . The value of Yr merely 
serves to distinguish between the classical and the Samuelson case: if it exceeds 1 the 
classical case applies; if it is below 1 we are dealing with the Samuelson case. 
3.2.2) Direction of Causality in the Interest Rate Determination 
Each of the successive points on the offer curve ( c!, ct), as traced out by the time 
path, corresponds to a different value of Pt except, of course, at the stationary 
equilibria, a and P, where the corresponding interest factors remain constant over 
time. This raises the question; how are these interest rates determined? Considering 
that the individuals' maximisation problem involves the choice of lifetime consumption 
patterns based on parametric interest rates12 (implying that the causality runs from Pt to 
c; and c~+i ), we are able to explain how successive consumption levels come about, but 
not how the interest rates are formed. 
11 For example I.Fisher (1961), quoted in Gale. 
12 The parametric treatment of interest rates together with changing rates implied by the time path 
points to a fundamental inconsistency: why should economic agents base their decisions on interest 
rates as if they would remain at the given values, whilst knowing that they will change over time? 
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Let us investigate whether the intertemporal system of equations [3. C'] and [3 .D'] 
suggests any direction of causality. The different values are calculated in the sequence 
etc. [3.F] 
This clearly demonstrates that, given the consumption level of the old, consumption by 
the young in the same time period is fully determined by the market clearing constraint 
[3. C'], which is a function of the endowments ( e1 and e2) and of the population growth 
rate (y). Thus consumption by the young would be predetermined by the parent 
generation, independently of both their own preferences and of the prevailing interest 
factor. This result would be rather disturbing if, for example, the young were endowed 
with all the income available as is the case in Samuelson's original model where 
e = (1, 0). It should be pointed out, however, that the time path which solves the 
intertemporal system of equations, satisfies the optimality principle. This has the 
advantage that successive equilibrium values may be calculated in any sequence, 
including the one given by [3 .F]. On the other hand, it does not entail any information 
on the direction of causality. 
Thus, Gale's model is an equilibrium model in the sense that the equilibrium interest 
rates in each period ( on which agents base their decisions) are implicitly assumed to 
satisfy the aggregate budget. The underlying dynamic process describing how the 
interest rate of a given period attains its equilibrium value, is, however, ignored. The 
model includes no specification (as for example a differential equation) that describes 
how relative prices - or equivalently, interest rates 
unsatisfied excess demands and supplies. 
change in response to 
Let us, for example, consider a separable utility function V ( c;, ct) such that the 
marginal utility of consumption at one age is independent of the consumption level at 
another age. That means 
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Suppose that, for a fixed level of c: (predetermined by the parent generation) the agent 
spends his entire income, but that the values for c:, c~+i and Pt satisfying his budget 
constraint do not maximise his utility. Assume, without loss of generality, that the 
agent's disequilibrium position is characterised by 
[3 .G] 
Differentiating the individual budget constraint [3 .A] we obtain 
which takes on a pos1t1ve or negative sign according to the definitions of the 
Samuelson and classical cases, respectively. Now consider a Samuelson agent's attempt 
to restore his personal equilibrium by raising the interest factor Pt· The consumption 
level c~+i would rise accordingly. Due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption, 
this lowers the denominator, raising both sides of the inequality [3 .G]. To ensure the 
convergence to an equilibrium interest rate we therefore need to impose the restriction . 
that 
Thus, in a sequential approach, the consumption levels c; and c~+i and the interest rate 
Pt will not necessarily satisfy simultaneously the individual budget, the optimality and 
the market clearing conditions. This further emphasises two points, firstly, that the 
direction of causality is not given by [3 .F], and secondly, that Gale is concerned with 
the existence of equilibrium rates of interest, while ignoring the conditions for 
convergence from initial disequilibrium to an optimal level. 
In the following section we will reconsider the time path followed by the economy and 
elucidate the role that a clearing house may have in interest rate determination. 
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3.2.3) Starting-up and Continuity of the Time Path 
In view of the stability (in the Samuelson case) or Pareto optimality (in the classical 
case) of the no trade equilibrium, there is no tendency to move away from the balanced 
programme, implying that no such time path is initiated. Moreover, as Samuelson 
(1958) pointed out, no voluntary intergenerational trade can possibly occur in the two 
generation model, because two successive generations, A and B, share only one time 
period in which both are alive. 
In the Samuelson case, intergenerational trade is impossible in the two period case, 
unless we design rules of the game that assure agents of their own retirement 
subsistence if they support the old generation during their own youth. Young 
individuals will be reluctant to provide for the currently old if they cannot 
simultaneously acquire a claim on the offspring's resources to prevent their lifetime 
consumption vector from dropping to e- (Fig.D). A second, possibly insignificant 
disincentive for saving while young is the opportunity cost13 involved in the adjustment 
process. Suppose the adjustment takes place in period t, where the agents from 
generation A are old, and those from generation B are young. In previous periods no 
trade took place, implying that each type-A agent's consumption level during his youth 
is fixed at ct1 = e1• Then any current savings of the B-agents that are transferred will 
shift the consumption vector of the old A-agents upwards along the vertical line 
c1 = e1. The first generation (B) that saves e1 - c~ to attain the desired lifetime 
consumption c•, will correspondingly shift the preceding generation (A) to point c•• on 
an even higher indifference curve (Fig.D). If, however, the adjustment process could 
be postponed by exactly one period then the B-agents would be able to attain the 
"superoptimal" point c•• and thereby secure the once-off utility gain for themselves 
rather than conveying it to their parents. Agents of subsequent generations will, of 
course, follow the same reasoning and, by symmetry will encounter no incentive to 
save in their first period of life. Clearly, quid pro quo does not hold and therefore the 
golden rule equilibrium will not emerge in the Samuelson case even though it is Pareto 
preferredl4 to the no trade equilibrium. Consequently, the population would 
indefinitely remain at the Pareto suboptimal no trade equilibrium. 
Due to the fact that the no trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal in the classical case, this 
economy too will not depart from the socially suboptimal balanced programme, 
13 In the classical case these are actual costs which have to be born by one or more generations, 
depending on the speed of the adjustment process. Thus nobody can be made better off without 
hurting someone else, implying that the no trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
14 The higher indifference curve can be attained without reducing anyone's lifetime utility. 
22 
implying that in neither model will the economy spontaneously deviate from the no 
trade scenario; moreover, that even were a deviation initiated, no time path could 
reasonably be expected to continue. To obviate the problems one needs to ask under 
what conditions it is economically reasonable to start with an initial consumption level 
c0 different from e. What adjustments can alleviate the starting-up problem and ensure 
the continuity of intergenerational trade over time? 
Will it help to relax our assumptions somewhat by allowing agents to issue IOU's? 
Suppose agents A are old, B are young in period t. In the classical model the young 
desire to spend in excess of their endowment e1 and would thus aim to borrow c: -e1 
from old agents A, issuing them IOU's over this amount. In the following period, t+ 1, 
however, agents A have died and are thus unable to cash in their IOU's from agents B. 
Similarly in the Samuelson model, where the young wish to save the amount e1 - c: by 
lending it to the old agents A15, the IOU's cannot be cashed in since agents A are dead 
in the next period and hence are unable to repay this amount. Thus in both cases quid 
pro quo is impossible, because either the creditors (in the classical model) or the 
debtors (in the Samuelson case) do not live in the period when repayment is due, hence 
no intergenerational trade will occur. 





Let us now introduce a central clearing house into the model and reconsider the 
classical case. As before young agents B aim to borrow c: -e1 from old agents A, but 
for the same reasons outlined in the previous section these utility maximising 
individuals will not voluntarily give up the required portion of their endowment, 
(1/y)[ ei - c:], but will instead consume c~ = ei- Even the presence of a clearing house 
does not alleviate the "starting-up" problem16, since it does not own any endowments 
and is unable to circumvent the aggregate budget constraint (3.C]. It can, however, 
ensure continuity in the time path towards the golden rule equilibrium as soon as a 
once-off government intervention, in the form of income tax levied on the old, forces 
IS Note that the optimal bundle c: in the Samuelson case does not generally coincide with < of the 
classical model as the distinction arises from different preferences relative to endowments. 
16 Recall that this problem arises due to the fact that the no trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal in the 
classical model. 
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them to forfeit a part e of their endowment. This tax levy forces the currently old to a 
lifetime consumption bundle indicated by point A below the offer curve (Fig.E(i)). 
Simultaneously it allows the clearing house to lend e;y to each young B-individual in 
return for an IOU. The realised consumption level of the latter, c: = e1 + Efy, will most 
probably fall short of the target level c~, but nevertheless resembles a gain in their 
utility level compared to the no trade scenario in spite of repayment, Pt Efy, due in the 
next period, t+ 1, when B-agents become old and C-agents are born. 
The clearing house holds the IOU's issued by agents B in their youth and is thus able to 
ensure that IOU's are being honoured - which is a prerequisite for future 
intergenerational trade: unless the clearing house receives repayments from B-agents, it 
is unable to extend any credit to the young agents C. The clearing house has a the 
second important function, namely, the determination of the interest factor. Due to the 
fact that the consumption good is perishable, the clearing house is unable to 
accumulate stock over time. Moreover, it has to lend out exactly the amount it has 
collected via tax levies (in period I) or debt repayments (in all subsequent periods) to 
avoid any net welfare loss. Noting that the supply of credit available in each period is 
determined by a contract between the parent generation and the clearing house agreed 










Provided that the clearing house knows the agents' preferences ordering, it would 
never charge an interest factor above p . From the offer curve in Fig.E it is clear that at 
any interest factor above p the young B-agents will borrow less than the available 
amount E/1; thus leaving the clearing house with an excess supply which, as it perishes, 
constitutes a waste for society . If, however, the clearing house extends its credit on 
more favourable terms (at p' say) the B-agents need only repay the smaller amount 
Pt' E/y (instead of Pt E/y) and their lifetime consumption bundle would accordingly shift 
upwards along the vertical line c1 = e1 + E/y, from B to B'. Given the limited resources 
of the clearing house, the agents' excess demands prevalent at the lower interest factor 
p' can only be partly satisfied. Consequently, point B' involves a comer solution for the 
individual, but it is nevertheless preferred to the consumption vector B . The clearing 
house can thus increase the attained utility level of a generation by lowering the 
interest rate; . but in doing so it will slow down the transition process to the social 
optimum considerably (or even reverse it). We therefore need to establish a lower 
bound for the interest factor. Let us start with the extreme case of Pt = 0, which 
enables B-agents to consume their total endowment e:z when they are old. But their 
implied consumption pattern B
0 
indicates that the economy will move back to the no 
trade position e within one period (Fig.E(ii)). 
The next alternative interest factor is one corresponding to the biological rate of 
population increase: given such a biological interest factor Pt = y, we will observe the 
economy being locked into the position BY indefinitely. Thus, in order to navigate the 
economy towards the target outcome c•, the clearing house must consistently charge 
an interest factor exceeding the population growth rate. Taking the latter as a lower 
bound, the choice of the exact value of p within the established range (y, p] is 
essentially a policy issue of the clearing house: if it aims to spread the potential benefits 
over all generations it should opt for a value close to the population growth rate, and 
an accordingly slow adjustment process. If its priority lies in a speedy transition to c•, 
however, it should settle for the relevant factor p prescribed by the offer curve. The 
resulting time path will zig-zag between the offer curve and the market clearing 
constraint as illustrated before, tracing the fastest route to c• (for a given initial tax e). 
If the objective entails an instantaneous adjustment to the social optimum, then the tax 
levy charged from the old must be large enough, i.e., e = e:z - c;. In this extreme 
scenario the old agents of a single generation bear the entire adjustment costs, 
illustrating that the speed of transition involves costs in the form of redistributing 
prospective utility gains of currently alive generations towards greater actual gains for 
future generations. 
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Let us now investigate whether the Samuelson model gives nse to similar 
observations. Unless the agents have some guarantee of repayment in the future, they 
are unlikely to save during their youth, and hence the Pareto preferred golden rule 
programme will not be attained. In the presence of a central clearing house whose sole 
purpose is to provide such desired guarantee, young B-agents will deposit an amount o 
in return for an IQU18. 
The lower bound of the interest factor is given by p : at this rate the young will not be 
induced to save; instead they will consume their entire endowment (Fig.F). As p rises, 
voluntary deposits o will rise in accordance with the shape of the offer curve, as long 
as backward bending offer curves are excluded. Moreover, Pt < y to satisfy the 
aggregate budget constraint. 
Fig. F 
Having established the range of values 
Pt can take on, what guidelines should 
the clearing house follow in order to 
decide on interest charges? It can and 
should simply set Pt = y to facilitate 
the movement to c•. In contrast to the 
classical model, here is no conflict of 
interest between any generation 
currently alive and the society at 
large. A closely related observation is 
that, in the Samuelson model, the 
clearing house need not know the 
individuals' preferences in order to 
guide the economy towards the optimal equilibrium as it is in the agents' interests to 
attain the Pareto preferred golden rule programme instantaneously. Against this 
background, the time path towards e, as prescribed by the deterministic equations 
[3 .C'] and [3 .D'], will never materialise in reality, as agents will attain higher 
indifference curves by instantaneously jumping to c* if the clearing house exists to 
ensure the continuity of intergenerational trade. 
18 Whether the clearing house distributes this amount among old A-agents or not is of secondary 
importance for the young. 
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3.2.4) Conclusion 
Gale's results are similar to Samuelson's, but his analysis is extended to incorporate 
both, positive and negative interest rates. Moreover, he clarifies the role that 
systematic subjective time preference plays in this regard. His framework is of value in 
analysing the effects of any institutional or policy changes ( such as the introduction of 
IOU's and a clearing house) on the resulting time path19. It must be emphasised, 
however, that Gale's model is an equilibrium model that ignores the sequential 
adjustment of disequilibrium interest rates to their equilibrium values. It is thus difficult 
to comment on the direction of causality inherent in the interest rate determination, 
unless a clearing house is introduced which simultaneously facilitates the continuity of 
intergenerational trade and resolves the causality problem. 
19 It might be interesting to analyse these problems in a game-theoretic framework, but such an 
approach is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: 
AZARIADIS' SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES 
So far we have assumed that agents operate under full certainty and therefore need not 
form expectations about future outcomes. Let us now introduce uncertainty into the 
model, but restrict the randomness to prices and hence output levels. To exclude the 
presence of intrinsic uncertainty, we assume that the structural elements of the 
economy, such as endowments, preferences and technology, remain in the realm of 
certainty. Instead of considering uncertainty inherent in the structure of the economy, 
we are now concerned with subjective beliefs. Suppose that a certain phenomenon -
call it "sunspot" - is completely unrelated to economic activity. What happens if agents 
believe that these sunspots are relevant to economic activity, even though there is, 
objectively speaking, no causal relationship between the two? To answer this question 
we will consider Azariadis' (1981) article "Self-fulfilling Prophecies" which 
demonstrates that random prices arise merely because they are believed to be 
stochastic. Using the overlapping generations framework again, we will analyse his 
claim that "extraneous uncertainty is both possible and 'frequent' among rational 
expectations equilibria" (p.380). 
4.1) THE MODEL 
4.1.1) Perfect Foresight 
Azariadis begins with a one good, two generations model under perfect foresight 
without population growth. In contrast to Gale {1973), however, he makes it explicit 
that the young use their labour endowment n, to produce y units of the perishable good 
via a constant returns to scale production function20 {n1 = y1 5: e1 = 1). As in 
Samuelson's model, agents receive no endowment in their last period of life (e2 = 0). 
Azariadis, however, goes even further and restricts all consumption to old age ( c1 = 0), 
thus clearly distinguishing between the agents who produce and those who consume. 
By implication nobody can consume even the smallest fraction of the own output, 
20 For simplicity let us use the identity function y' = n•. We thus remain essentially in the pure 
exchange model, while simultaneously allowing for the extension to the productive model. 
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forcing the young to trade all their produce for the unit of fiat money, m = 1, held 
exclusively by the old. 
To accommodate the above specifications, agents' preferences are expressed in terms 
of current work and future consumption, as given by the utility function 






Analogous to the general constrained optimisation problem of chapter one, agents will 
maximise their utility subject to the budget21 
P n t = ct+1 t I 2 · [4.A] 
This lifetime budget constraint is effectively a combination of the liquidity constraints 
agents face in their two periods of life, 
t t 
P1n1 = md 
and t+l t+) Pt+1 C2 = m, . 
Since fiat money is the only store of value, the amount earned during the agent's youth 
is carried over to the following period; yielding his lifetime budget. Equilibrium in the 
money market, by contrast, requires that the young agents' demand for nominal money 
balances, m ~, equal the corresponding supply of them by the old in the same time 
period, m!. Satisfying Walras's law, this equality implies that the product market clears 
simultaneously. 
Returning to the individual's choice problem, we will observe equilibrium when the 
levels of labour input and future consumption satisfy the first order condition 
[4.B] 
21 For the sake of consistency with previous chapters, I have substituted Pt!pt+l = Pt· Current absolute 
prices Pt are then uniquely determined by the liquidity constraint of the old, i.e., c2 = m;Pt· 
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Defining U(c) = c u'(c), G(n) = n g'(n) [ 4.iii] 
this equation becomes 
In view of the budget constraint, the production function and the market clearing 
condition ( analogous to [ 1. C]), 
this yields the following law of motion22: 
yt+l = 0 
U(yt+l) = G(yt) 
if yt = 0 
if yt > 0. 
[4.C] 
[4.D] 
Given an initial output level, the functions U and G (which are essentially demand and 
supply functions) are instrumental in the transition of the economy from one state into 
the following one. We therefore state the most important properties below, with a 
fuller discussion of their characteristics left to Appendix 2. The assumptions 
and 
ml\,-+O G(yt) = 0 
lill\,-+I G(yt) = 00 
together with the monotonicity of g' imply that the function G is increasing, i.e., 
G'(yt) > 0. 
[4.iv] 
[4.v] 
The rate of change of U, by contrast, depends on the nature of the relationship 
between current leisure and future consumption. In particular, 
22 We can omit the subscripts that refer to the individuals' age, since only the old consume. 
and 
U'(yt) < 0 
U'(yt) > 0 
if they are gross complements, 
if they are gross substitutes23. 
A stationary equilibrium is then characterised by 
U(y**) = G(y**) 
where the output remains at the constant level y•• for all time periods. 





Let us now introduce extraneous uncertainty into the model: rational agents will form 
expectations based on past and current observations of prices and output levels. 
Denoting the information set available to agents in period t by O., they now maximise 
their expected lifetime utility function 
subject to the expected budget constraint 
[4.A'] 
where the tilde indicates randomness. The corresponding first order condition 
[4.B'] 
illustrates that the probability distribution of Pt is conditional on the information set n.. 
In view of the expected budget constraint the probability distribution of yt+1 ( or c~+i) at 
the individual level is derived from that of p1 • 
23 The signs can be established by differentiating U(c) = c u'(c) with respect toy: 
U'- dUCc> - du..!lf.+c d1u - u'k 
- dy -dcdy dcdy- dy• 
because the mixed derivative equals zero. Substitutability of leisure and consumption means that 
: > 0, implying that U' > O; mutatis mutandis for gross complementarity implying U' < 0. 
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The distinctive characteristic of extrinsic uncertainty ( as opposed to intrinsic 
uncertainty) lies in the independence of individual events from joint events in the 
aggregate. The implied absence of any covariance in the information set can be 
expressed by the equality of the expected value of a product of two terms with the 
product of their expected values conditional on the same information set, in particular 
Interpreting this equality, it must be emphasised that the expectation of the marginal 
utility of future consumption, E[ u' ( c~+i) I n1], is formed at the individual level, but 
that the expected level of consumption in the following period, E[ c~+i I n1 ], depends 
on the aggregation of all such beliefs ( as well as the market clearing constraint) and is, 
therefore, independent of the former even though it is based on the same information 
set. We will now use the independence of expectations underlying our extrinsic 
uncertainty assumption, together with the definitions of U and G, the individual and 
aggregate budget constraints and the production function, to manipulate the first order 
condition [4.B'] and ultimately yield the modified law of motion [4.D'], analogous to 
[4.D]: 
::::::> n; E[ A c~+i u'( c~+i) I nt] = E[c~+' I n1 ] n; g'(n;) 
::::::> n: E[A Int] E[u(c~+') Int] = E[ c~+i I n1] G(n!) 
::::::> E[u(y~+') I n1 ] = G(y:) [4.D'] 
Azariadis confines the equilibrium output to solutions with the Markov property 
where ~ = yt and output yt attains one of the two discrete values of the set {yl, y2}. 
The corresponding stationary transition probabilities, 
q1 = P (1+1 = yi I yt = yt] 
q2 = p [yt+ 1 = y2 I yt = y2] 
1- q1 = P [yt+i = y2 I yt = yt] 
1- q2 = P (1+1 = yi I yt = y2], [4.E] 
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reflect the stochastic properties of any variable believed to influence econonuc 
activity. 
A self-fulfilling equilibrium can now be defined as a set of numbers (q1, q2, y1, y2), 
with all elements lying in the interval [0,1], satisfying the law of motion [4.D'], i.e., 
q1 U(y1) + (1 - q1) U(y2) = G(y1) 
(1 - q2) U(yl) + q2 U(y2) = G(y2). 
4.1.3) Necessary Conditions 
[4.F] 
Azariadis derives two special assumptions that exclude extraneous uncertainty, namely: 
1) consumption and leisure are gross substitutes 
and/or 2) consumption and leisure are gross complements and q1 + q2 ~ 1. 
Consequently a necessary but not sufficient condition24 for sunspot equilibria is 
gross complementarity with q1 + q2 < 1, 
or equivalently25, U(y2) ~ G(yl) < G(y2) ~ U(yl) with y2 > y1. [Cl] 
Referring to the shaded areas in Fig.H(iv), this necessary condition can be illustrated in 
the y1-y2 plane by areas above (below) the 45° line, bounded above (below) by the line 
U(y1) = G(y2) and below (above) by the line U(y2) = G(y1) . These areas are non-empty 
if, at the stationary equilibrium S, the curve 
a : U(y1) = G(y2) 
is steeper than curve ~: U(y2) = G(yl). [4.G] 
For this purpose it is sufficient that the law of motion in equation [4.D] yields a locally 
stable stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight case, i.e., that 
or 
IG'(y**)I < IU'(y**)I 
G'(y••) + 1 > O 
U'(y• •) 
where y** indicates a stationary equilibrium. 
24 For the remainder of this section we will assume gross complementarity. 
2s This equivalence is shown in Appendix 1. 
[C2] 
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4.1.4) Likelihood of Self-fulfilling Prophecies 
Let us now review how Azariadis treats the question of the likelihood of sunspot 
equilibria. He claims that, "under the assumptions made . . . extraneous uncertainty is 
not only possible but 'probable' as well; for most configurations of the exogenous 
probabilities, q1 and q2 such that q1 + q2 ~ 1, there exists one stationary equilibrium and 
at least two other distinct equilibria such that y1 ~ y2 " (p.389). For this purpose he 
defines the function 
T( )= G{y)-qU(y) 
q, y 1 
-q 
[4.H] 
where illlly-+ l G(y) = 00, llll\,-+O U(y) = B ~ 00. [4.viii] 
Using equations [4.F] and [4.G] it is obvious that, for self-fulfilling prophecies to exist 
and 
I: U(yl) = T( q2, y2) 
II: U(y2) = T(q1, yl) [4.J] 
must hold simultaneously. This means that, drawing cuives I and II as in Azariadis' 
article (fig.3, p.390)26 and treating the probabilities as parameters, enables us to easily 
locate any existing sunspot equilibria at the points of intersection. Based on this figure, 
Azariadis concludes that extraneous uncertainty will characterise at least two-thirds of 
equilibria in the region 
or equivalently, at least one-third of all equilibria in the region 
26 Fig.L portrays essentially the same information. 
4.2) CRITIQUE 
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Referring to Fig.H, let us explain how the local stability condition [C2] translates to 
the relative steepness of the curves a and b: Quadrants (i) and (iii), which are 
symmetrical with respect to y1 = y2, show the curves U(yl), G(yl) and U(y2), G(y2), 
respectively27. Curve a can now be derived in quadrant (iv) by finding those values of 
yl and y2 that satisfy U(y1) = G(y2). Similarly, curve b shows the combinations ofyl, y2 
such that U(y2) = G(y1) - the mirror image of a with respect to y1 = y2. It can now 
easily be observed that a stable stationary equilibrium ( characterised by U being steeper 
27 For explanations of the shape of curves U and G refer to Appendix 2. 
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than G) corresponds to a. cutting ~ from above. Consequently, there exists a non-
empty set K, indicated by the shaded areas, that satisfy the necessary condition [Cl]: 
Consider, for example, points a : u(y 1) = G(y;) and b: u(y~) = G(y 1). 
At any point below a, 
At any point above b, 






y2 ~y; => G(y2)~G(y;)=U(y1) . 
y2 ~ y~ => u(y2) ~ u(y~) = G(y 1) . 
u(y2) ~ G(y 1) < G(y2) ~ u(y 1) . 
(ii) 
Fig.J 
Thus condition [C2] evaluated at the stationary equilibrium is sufficient to ensure non-
empty areas that satisfy the necessary condition [Cl]. One can ask, is [C2] necessary? 
To answer this question let us first investigate the sensitivity of these areas to the 
shapes of G and U. Referring to Fig.J, it becomes clear that the shaded areas between 
a. and p increase the more concave G and U for O ~ y ~ y••, and the more convex G 
and U for y•• ~ y < 1 are; i.e., the steeper U and the flatter G become. By symmetry, a 
reversal of the curvatures of G and U will at least decrease the size of set K. 
To investigate the impact on the size of area K, 
consider for example Fig.K28: the stationary 
equilibrium y•• is unstable, because the steeper 
curve G(y**) relative to U(y**) in panel (ii) 
translates to line J3 intersecting ex. from above at 
Sin panel (i). Therefore, combinations ofy1 and 
y2 in the vicinity of the stationary equilibrium S 
will never give rise to self-fulfilling prophecies. 
However, sunspot equilibria are still possible in 
the shaded areas in the north-western and 
south-eastern comers of panel (i) . The 
corresponding set K will be non-empty if 
somewhere in the unit square curve ex. cuts J3 
from above, for example D 1 and D2. The points 
of intersection Di(d1, d2) and Dld2, d1) are 
stable limit cycles in the perfect foresight case29 
characterised by 










Thus, instead of confining stability to the stationary equilibrium S(y**, y**), we can 
change this sufficient condition to become necessary and sufficient for [Cl]; namely if 
there exists a pair of output levels (y1, y2) E (0, I) such that, 
IG'(yl~ < IU'(y2)1 
IG'(y2~ < IU'(yl)I. 
[C2*] 
To conclude this section, let us summarise the results developed so far. Azariadis has 
established a necessary condition for self-fulfilling prophecies [Cl] and a condition 
sufficient for this necessary condition [C2]. We have suggested that the latter can 
easily be extended to become necessary and sufficient for [Cl]. But, unless we show 
under which circumstances curves I and II have indeed points of intersection other 
28 The shapes of U and G as illustrated violate some of the specifications we have asswned for the 
remaining analysis. 
29 This scenario is very similar to Gale's example of cycling. 
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than the stationary equilibrium S30, we are still lacking a sufficient condition that 
guarantees extrinsic uncertainty equilibria. Azariadis thus identifies cases that are 
necessary for sunspot equilibria and also gives an example of self-fulfilling prophecies 
(fig.3 , p.390), but he does not prove the existence of such equilibria under the stated 
conditions. 
Thus in contrast to his claim of having identified "a set of sufficient ... conditions that 
guarantee the existence of replicating equilibria with extraneous uncertainty" (p.388), 
he has isolated only necessary conditions for extraneous uncertainty. This, however, 
does not ensure the existence of sunspot equilibria as such. It merely stipulates under 
which circumstances self-fulfilling prophecies are possible. This shortcoming will be 
further investigated and rectified in the following sections. 
4.2.2) Sufficient Conditions Revisited 
To identify a sufficient condition for self-fulfilling prophecies we need to verify that 
curves I and II indeed assume the shapes as illustrated. Given Azariadis' assumptions, 
we have established the following properties in Appendix 3: 
(P 1) Both curves are monotonically downward 
sloping in the y1-y2 plane, i.e., they lie in 
the shaded areas, cutting S(y**, y**). 
(P2) Curve I (11) cuts the line y1 = 1 (y2 = 1) 
on the interval y2 (yl) E (0, y**]. 
(P3) Curve I (11) cuts the y2 (y1) axis on the 





30 Recall that such points of intersection indicate the existence of sunspot equilibria. [4.J] . 
II 
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These properties, however, do not suffice to guarantee the existence of the two points 
of intersection E 1, E2. We further need to impose the local stability condition on the 
stationary equilibrium in the extrinsic uncertainty case31, i.e., that at S, curve I is 
steeper than curve II, which will then ensure the shape of the curves as illustrated in 
Fig.L. This condition implies that: 
<=>32 
dy2 < dy2 
dyt I(y•) dyl n(y•) 
(1-qi} U'{y **) 
< 




With [C3] we have thus established a sufficient condition for sunspot equilibria. But 
what is its underlying logic? To facilitate the interpretation recall that stability under 
full certainty is characterised by 
IG'I < lul, [C2] 
this means, supply must change at a lower rate than demand. Note that the 
introduction of extrinsic uncertainty subjects demand, but not supply, to randomness. 
To adjust for this presence of uncertainty, we therefore need to multiply the right hand 
side by the probability that the economy switches from one state to another. We thus 
obtain 
31 This condition is analogous to local stability in the perfect foresight case, where at S, a is steeper 
than p (C2]. 
32 This slope is derived in Appendix 3. 
33 Keeping in mind that this equality is evaluated at y••, we can omit this value. 
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where the sum of q1 and q2 reflects the probability that no transition takes place3
4. This 







Let us now consider the graphical derivation of the curves I and II, using the same 4-
quadrant graph as for the derivation of a. and ~ (Fig.H). In order to derive curve 
II: U(y2) = T(q1, yl) 
it 1s necessary to fix q1. This enables us to draw q1 U(yl), hence G(y
1) - q1 U(yl), 
34 At this stage it becomes obvious why q1 + q2 < 1 is necessary for sunspot equilibria: a violation of 
this condition implies a nonpositive probability that the economy oscillates between two states of 
nature, making uncertainty equilibria impossible. 
40 
and ultimately 
Fig.M quadrant (i) shows the three curves T{q1 = Y., yl), T(q1 = Yi, y1) and 
T{q1 = 34, y1). Using these and the curve U(y2) in quadrant (iii), we can derive three 
curves of type II, each corresponding to a specific probability q1. Similarly, a set of 
curves type I can be derived. 
It can now easily be observed that curve II (I) is bound by curve J3 (a) and the line 
y• = y** (y2 = y**, respectively): 
and 
i.e., curve II approaches P as q1 falls to 
zero, 
i.e., curve II approaches the vertical 
line y• = y** as q1 rises to one. 
By symmetry, curve I approaches a. as q2 falls to zero, and it approaches the horizontal 
line y2 = y** as q2 rises to one. 
4S0 
; 
yi i YI 




We can therefore draw the following conclusions: 
1) If a is flatter than p, I and II cannot intersect each other except at S (Fig.N(i)). This 
implies that an unstable stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight case prevents 
extrinsic uncertainty ( unless the curves a and p take on different shapes as, for 
example, in Fig.K). This result is consistent with the statement stipulating that 
condition [C3] is sufficient for sunspot equilibria. 
2) As long as a is steeper than P at S, there exist some probabilities such that I and II 
do intersect, as indicated by the overlapping shaded areas in Fig.N(ii). But Azariadis' 
restriction q1 + q2 < 1 is not sufficient to ensure this existence. With q1 < 1 
sufficiently close to 1, curve II may be steeper than I(q2 = 0) which is equal to the 
a curve; in this case no points of intersection and consequently no sunspot equilibria 
would exist. Thus, even in Azariadis' example, the set of probabilities that 
characterises extraneous uncertainty may be smaller than 
Imposing the sufficient condition [C3], this set will be reduced to 
indicated by the shaded area in Fig.P, excluding the 45° ray. The combinations of 
(q1, q2) in this set give rise to sunspot equilibria unless y1 = y2. Thus according to 
Fig.L, at least two-thirds of the equilibria in this smaller region R- are characterised 
by extraneous uncertainty. 
Azariadis based his conclusion that "at least 
'one-third' and less than 'one-half of all 
equilibria" (p.390) are self-fulfilling 
prophecies on the set R instead of the set R-
which will be smaller than R to the extent 
that the value of -G';U' at S exceeds zero. 
The lower bound of the likelihood of 
sunspot equilibria may therefore be 
substantially smaller than one-third, 
depending on the value 1 + G';U' takes on, 





q I+ q2 = 1 
q +q=G'+l<l 
I 2 U' 
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particular on the respective slopes ofU and G. 
Within Azariadis' framework we have thus identified the combinations of q1 and q2 that 
are necessary and sufficient for sunspot equilibria35 . Our next task will be to 
investigate plausible combinations of q1 and q2 on a priori grounds, given that our 
assumptions hold. 
4.2.3) Conceptual Inconsistencies 
At this stage, I would like to emphasise that yt is an element of the discrete set {y1, y2 }, 
implying that Fig.H(iv) conveys some information about possible pairs of the two states 
y1 and y2, and the relative sizes of U(yi), G(yi) for i = 1, 2. It may, however, be 
misleading to introduce the local stability condition [C2] of the law of motion [ 4.D] 
into the same set of axes, as this would immediately suggest a time path as illustrated 
in Fig.H(i), where - in contrast to our restriction - y would take on different values 
overtime. 
To avoid any confusion we should clearly distinguish between the discrete values of 
y1, y2 and any linear combinations thereof Suppose the latter can be expressed as the 
continuous variables 
x1 = E[yt+1 I yt = Y1] =q,y' +(1-qi}y2 
x2 =E[yt+' I y1 = y2]=(l-q2}Y1 +q2y2 
with x1, x2 E [y1, y2]. 
[4.K] 
That means, xi is the expected value of y1+1, contingent on the present state yt = yi. 
This definition now allows us to rewrite the law of motion that incorporates extrinsic 
uncertainty [ 4 .D'] as: 
u(x') = u[q,y' +(1-qi}y2] = G(y') 
u(x2) = u[(1-qJy1 +q 2y2] = G(y2). 
35 That means q1 + q2 < 1 is necessary, q1 + q2 < G';U' + I is sufficient. 
[4.D"] 
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Moreover, any set (q1, q2, y1, y2) satisfying equation [4.D"] is a sunspot equilibrium. 
An interesting aside is that this definition only coincides with Azariadis' definition of a 
self-fulfilling equilibrium [ 4 .F] if 










We should therefore deduce that Azariadis has implicitly assumed linear U functions36 
- an assumption that allows him to construct the T(q, y) function designed to show the 
likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies ( as discussed a previously in section 4 .1. 4). 
For the time being, we want to consider the more general case without restricting the 
U function to linearity. In particular, we want to investigate whether the 
transformation of Azariadis' analysis in terms of the two Markov states y1, y2 into a 
system of the expected values x1, x2 adds any new insights. 
In view of [4.D"] and [4.K] we have four equations in the six variables yi, xi, qi for 
i = 1, 2. Moreover, the assumptions on U and G (in particular their continuity and 
monotonicity) are sufficient to ensure that, for any given pair (y1, y2), we can solve for 
the unique set (x1, x2, q1, q2) that corresponds to a sunspot equilibrium. Picking an 
arbitrary point (y1, y2), the specific functional forms of U and G and the fact that self-
fulfilling prophecies satisfy [4.D"], i.e., U(xi) = G(yi) for i = 1, 2, enable us to solve for 
the corresponding expected values (x1, x2) unambiguously. This, in tum, allows us to 
solve for the equilibrium probabilities ( q1, q2), because the definitions of xi can be 
rewritten as functions in y and x values 
I 2 
( 
I I 2) X -y 





2 I 2) X - Y 
q2 X , Y • y = 2 I 
y -y 
[4.K'] 
Schematically the procedure could be represented as follows: 
___.__[3.K_._] _ ( ) 
) qi• q2 · [4.L] 
36 Strictly speaking this is inconsistent with the nonlinearity of U as derived in Appendix 2, but a 
detailed discussion of possible ways to resolve these inconsistencies is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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The one-to-one correspondence ensured by equations [4.D"] thus allows the 
transformation from the y1-y2 space into the x1-x2 space, and vice versa. Consequently 
we can derive the curves 
and 
a.': U(xl) = G(x2) 
13': U(x2) = G(x1) [4.G'] 
with each of their points (x1, x2) corresponding to exactly one point (y1, y2) on the a. 
and p curve, respectively. Although no probabilities feature in the latter curves 
explicitly, a. and p can be easily obtained from the definition of sunspot equilibria by 
setting q2 and q1 equal to zero. Thus any point a.(y1 = a.1, y2 = a.2) on the a. curve 
would typically37 correspond to the point a.'(x1 -:t:. a.2, y2 = a.1) and the probabilities 
0 ~ q1 ~ 1, q2 = 0. Similarly, any point fJ(yl = pi, y2 = p2) would typically correspond 
to the point P'(x1 = P2, y2 -:t:. P1) and the probabilities q1 = 0, 0 ~ q2 ~ 1. The transition 
of the y1-y2 plane into the x1-x2 plane thus involves, loosely speaking, a "distorted 
reflection" through the stationary equilibrium point S, where the distortion involves an 
elongation or compression in any direction - horizontal for points on the a. curve, 
vertical for points on the P curve (Fig. Q). Despite the distortion, the transformation 
preserves the ordering of the points in the sense that the images of a. and p remain 
continuous and those of all points within the shaded areas in Fig.H(iv) are accordingly 
bounded by the a.' and 13' curves in the x1-x2 space. Thus, by construction, the a.' and W 
y2, x2 
Fig.Q 
curves serve as an envelope to 
possible sunspot equilibria. 
Consequently, Azariadis' result 
concerning the necessary condition of 
self-fulfilling prophecies (namely that 
the equilibrium probabilities 
corresponding to the points in the 
shaded areas satisfy the condition 
q1 + q2 < 1) carries over when 
analysed in terms of the expected 
values x1, x2. 
37 This case applies except at the points of intersection of a and P where q1 = q2 = 0, and 
(yl =al= pl, y2 = a2 = p2) would correspond to (x1 = a2 = p2, x2 = a 1 = p1) . At these points the 
economy would oscillate between the two states y1 and y2 with certainty. 
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Apart from the fact that the analysis in terms of these expected values is conceptually 
superior to the discrete y1-y2 framework, we should enquire whether this alternative 
exposition generates new information. While the transformation does not produce new 
results, it changes the informational content of the diagrams. By definition every point 
in the x1-x2 space is based on, and therefore incorporates, the values of yi, qi (i = 1, 2) 
that allow for extrinsic uncertainty equilibria. Moreover, its derivation clearly shows 
the correspondences among any three sets of pairs (y1, y2), (xl, x2) and (q1, q2) as 
summarised in [4.L]: because xi is not monotonic in qi, a given pair of (q1, q2) may 
have multiple solutions (y1, y2) that satisfy the conditions for sunspot equilibria38, 
implying that the relationship between the sets y = { (y1, y2) I yi E (0, 1)} and 
q = { ( q1, q2) I qi E (0, 1 ), q1 + q2 < 1} is one-to-many in contrast to the one-to-one 
correspondence between y and x = {(x1, x2) I xi E (0, 1)}. 
This asymmetry does not cause a problem for our analysis smce it makes more 
economic sense to identify possible outcomes to which the transition probabilities 
apply than to fix these probabilities parametrically without specifying the states of 
nature39. Despite this, Azariadis has followed the latter approach by constructing the 
T(q, y) function. Given this conceptual difficulty and noting that the construction of 
the general T function40 relies on the unduly restrictive linearity of the U function -
which, as mentioned already, causes inconsistencies - one advantage of analysis in 
terms of expected outcomes become apparent: although it does not yield new results, it 
does not suffer from the above mentioned shortcomings. 
4.2.4) The Likelihood of Sunspot Equilibria Revisited 
Azariadis explicitly uses the rational expectations framework4 1, hence his agents do not 
make systematic errors. Suppose now that a variable is deemed by public opinion to 
have a bearing on economic activity42 such that {yt} follows the Markov process, with 
transition probabilities given by [4.E]. 
38 Az.ariadis follows this approach. 
39 According to the definition of the transition probabilities [4.E], this approach is impossible. 
40 Despite its deficiences, the T function is an analytical construct useful} to delineate the relationship 
between the individuals' preference ordering (incorporated in the U and G functions) and the size of 
the set R· more clearly. 
41 "extraneous uncertainty is both possible and 'frequent' among rational expectations equilibria", 
p.380. 
42 We will abstract from the question whether it is indeed rational for agents to do so, as rational 
expectations are merely taken to mean that agents do not make systematic errors. 
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Suppose q1 + q2 ~ 1. This rules out sunspot equilibria completely, because the implied 
probability that the economy oscillates, 1 - ( q1 + q2), is nonpositive. Thus all such 
( q1, q2) values correspond to the stationary equilibrium value y•• unless the economy 
remains at disequilibrium. Although agents expect extrinsic uncertainty, in this scenario 
the equilibrium outcome is systematically y•• (with probability 1) - in contrast to their 
belief Hence, their expectations will have to adjust to prevent a systematic 
expectational error: rational agents will either believe that the economy follows the 
stationary path with certainty, or the probabilities will be reevaluated such that 
q1 + q2 < 1. Thus, rational expectations is inconsistent with agents' belief in the 
existence of sunspot equilibria with q1 + q2 ~ 1. 
A similar argument applies to any pair of transition probabilities that does not coincide 
with the unique pair of equilibrium probabilities corresponding to a given pair of 
output levels. For two possible states of nature (y1, y2) that may occur, there is 
exactly one corresponding pair of probabilities (q1, q2) that will generate extrinsic 
uncertainty equilibria. Taking the transition probabilities to represent agents' beliefs, 
how do we know that they believe in exactly that unique pair of probabilities that 
equilibrates the market? The answer lies in the assumed Markov property with 
stationary transition probabilities: the economy can only oscillate between the states 
y1, y2 at the specific probabilities q1, q2 if this pair resembles an equilibriu~; if the 
probabilities were to deviate from these equilibrium values then (y1 , y2 ) could never be 
a sunspot equilibrium (because of the uniqueness of the corresponding probabilities). 
Hence output values cannot swing between y1 , y2 at any stationary transition 
probabilities ( q 1, q 2) -:;; (qi, q 2), because (y1, y2, qi, q 2) reflects a disequilibrium 
position, contradicting the Markov property. Thus it is essentially the Markov property 
that ensures the existence of self-fulfilling prophecies, provided that the required 
conditions hold. Hence the question on the likelihood of sunspot equilibria is directly 
related to the probability that the required Markov structure will emerge: if it holds, 
extraneous uncertainty equilibria will arise with probability one. 
An alternative approach would be to abandon the Markov property and reconsider the 
model's behaviour. If we assume, for example, that beliefs are exogenously given, it is 
highly unlikely that the believed probabilities match the unique pair of equilibrium 
probabilities. Consequently, we would end up with a scenario that would portray the 
other extreme, namely the virtual non-existence of sunspot equilibria. Another option 
would be to incorporate a learning process, where the question arises: during such an 
adjustment process, will an initial disequilibrium move to a sunspot equilibrium or to 
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the stationary one? Thus, without any specification of the fonnation of beliefs, we are 
unable to comment on the likelihood of sunspot equilibria. 
4.2.5) Conclusion 
Azariadis' restriction of the equilibrium pnce set43 to solutions with the Markov 
property is fundamental for his analysis: on the one hand it facilitates the parametric 
treatment of the transition probabilities because they are stationary by definition, on the 
other hand their stationarity makes it impossible to answer the question; how likely is it 
that extrinsic uncertainty equilibria will emerge? Agents believe in the values of q1 and 
q2 only if the economy followed exactly these transition probabilities in the past. But 
the stationary nature of these probabilities implies that the economy must be in 
equilibrium, as no disequilibrium would maintain their stationarity. Equilibrium is only 
obtained if the law of motion [ 4 .D'] is satisfied. Comparing this line of argument with 
Azariadis' definition of a self-fulfilling equilibrium [4.F], we must deduce that an 
oscillation between two outcomes following the steady Markov probabilities is an 
extraneous uncertainty equilibrium already. 
The assumed Markovian structure thus makes analysis of the likelihood of self-fulfilling 
prophecies redundant. Consequently, we must rephrase the question to be answered in 
this context, and investigate to what extent such beliefs are self-perpetuating. 
Azariadis' model can be used to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
maintain sunspot equilibria, but it cannot explain how the economy arrives at such an 
equilibrium. 
43 In view of the liquidity constraint of the old, ez = m;Pt, output values y can be interpreted as the 
commodity price of money. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has briefly reviewed Samuelson's (1958) consumption-loan model to 
familiarise the reader with the widely used overlapping generations approach to the 
interest rate problem. Apart from setting the analytical framework, Samuelson's main 
contribution was found to lie in the demonstration that the optimal interest rate is 
unstable, implying that a competitive economy may fail to approach the social 
optimum. 
Gale (1973) not only derived similar results, he refined and extended them in his 
intertemporal exchange model. This facilitated a clear distinction between the 
Samuelson and the classical assumptions, and their respective implications for the 
Pareto optimality and stability of the stationary states. It was emphasised that the 
equilibrium nature of his model ignored the sequential approach of disequilibrium rates 
of interest to their equilibrium levels. Thus, while it specified the characteristics of 
equilibrium interest rates, the model failed to explain how these values were attained 
so as to ensure the simultaneous equilibrium at the individual and aggregate levels. 
This shortcoming, as well as the problems concerning the launching and continuity of 
intergenerational trade, can be rectified by the introduction of a clearing house. 
In the last chapter, we analyse the existence and likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies 
as portrayed by Azariadis (1981). We note that his conclusions are largely based on an 
example, they cannot possibly claim general applicability. In our attempt to identify 
general conditions that guarantee the existence of sunspot equilbria (to complement the 
necessary ones put forward by Azariadis), the following two observations are made: 
firstly, the properties of demand and supply functions influence the stability of the 
economic system under both, perfect foresight and uncertainty. Secondly, stability in 
the full certainty case is a prerequisite for, and may translate, to stability in the 
stochastic setting, depending on the transition probabilities, if one adds the proviso that 
special cases as illustrated in Fig.K are excluded. It was also shown that for any two 
states of nature there exists a unique pair of transition probabilities that gives rise to an 
extrinsic uncertainty equilibrium. This one-to-many correspondence between 
consumption levels and probabilities, together with the assumed Markovian structure 
of the economy, makes it redundant to examine the likelihood of self-fulfilling 
prophecies in the given framework. 
APPENDIX 1 
To prove the equivalence of gross complementarity with q1 + q2 < 1, and the condition 
U(y2)::; G(yl) < G(y2)::; U(y•) it can be shown that: 
1) Given gross complementarity ( i.e. U' < 0 ), q1, q2 E [O, 1] 
and the definition of sunspot equilibria 
=> U(y2)::; G(yl) < G(y2)::; U(y•) 
Let y2 > y1 => 
[4.F] 
U(y2) < U(y•) 
u(y2 )-G{y1) 
q1 = u(y2)-u(y1) 
G(y2 )- u(yt) 
q2 = u{y2)-u{y1) 
U(y2) - U(y1) < 0 
G(yt)- u(yt) 
I-qi = u(y2)-u(y1) 
u(y2 )-G{y2) 
I-q2 = u{y2)- u(yt) 
As their denominators are negative, so must be their numerators. 
Thus U(y2) ::; G(y•) ::; U(yl) 
U(y2)::; G(y2) ::; U(yl) 
Since G' > 0 => 
2) Given U(y2) :s;; G(yl) < G(y2) :s;; U(y1) ify2 > y1, 
and the existence of sunspot equilibria 
=> ql + q2 < 1. 
[4.F] => u(y2)-G(y1) G(y2)-u(y1) 
q1 + q2 = u(y2)-u(yt) + u(y2)-u(yt) 
u(y2 )- u(y1) G(y2 )-G(y1) 
= u(y2)- u(y1) + u(y2)- u(y1) 
= I + 
The result, Li < 0, follows directly from U(y2) :s;; G(yl) < G(y2) :s;; U(y1), 
i.e., the numerator of Li 
its denominator 
G(y2) - G(yl) > 0 




In line with our restrictions on U and G [ 4 .i - vi, viii, ix] these curves exhibit the 
following properties: 
G(O) = 0, 
G11(y) > O 
li~--.1 G(y) = oo, G'(y) > 0 
asy~ 1, i.e., G is convex 
G11(y) is of indeterminate sign as y ~ 0 (in Fig.H, G11{0) < 0) 
[4.iv, v] 
U(O) = B < oo [4.viii] 
U{l) = M > 0 (Appendix 3) [4.ix] 
U'(y) < 0 [4.vi] 
U 11(y) is of indeterminate sign as y ~ 1 (in Fig.H, U11(l) > 0). 
U11{y) < 0 as y ~ Obecause U' = u' +yu 11 < 0 
u' < y lu 11 I, u' > 0, u11 < 0 
{
o < u'(O) < o lu"(O)I} 
0 < u'{l) < lu"{l)I 
u'{l) < u'(O) 
=> 0 < u'(l) < u'(O) < 0 lu11{0)I = 0, 
contradicting u 11 < O 
[by 4.i] 
unless li~__.0 u
11(y) = -oo 
Thus li~__.0 U"(y) = ~__.0 2u
11(y) + yu"' 
= l~__.0 2u
11(y) + 0 
= -00 < 0 
This also implies that U(O) = B< oo rather than B ~ oo. 
APPENDIX3 
Property 1 
Given q1, total differentiation of IT: (1-q1) U(y2) = G(yl) - q1 U(yl) 
yields (1-q1) U'(y2) dy2 = G'(yl) dyl _ q1 U'(yl) dyl 
dy2 
dyl 
because G' > 0, U' < 0 (from [4.v, vi]). 





It is sufficient to show that curve I does not cut the y1 axis on the interval [O, 1]. 
Recall, that by [ 4 .H, J] the equation for I 
Let 
Using [ 4.ii, iii], 
M = lin\--.1 U(y). 
G(y2 )- q2 U(y2) 
l-q2 
M = lin1y__.1 y u'(y) = lin1y__. 1 u'(y) > 0 
Defining y2 as the y2 value corresponding to y1 = 1, it satisfies 
[4.ix] 
Now consider 
= lim G(y2 )- q2 u(y2) 
y--+ 0 1- q2 
=--9..L_B<O 
1-q2 
because of [4.v,viii] 
Since T(q2, y
2) is increasing in y2 (G' > 0, U' < 0) and 
we can conclude that y2 ~ 0. 
Since the curves I and II are monotonically downward sloping, (P2) is established. 
Property 3 
It is sufficient to show that curve I cuts the y2 axis on the interval [O, 1]. 
v 
lin\,--.1 U(y1) = B ~ oo from [4.viii] 
The y2 value corresponding to y1 = 0, call it y2, satisfies 
Now consider 
Thus 
G(y2 )- q2 U(y2 ) = B 
1-q2 
. G(y2)-q2 U(y2) = hmy -. i 
1-q2 
oo - q M 
- 2 
1-q2 
because of [ 4 . viii, ix] 
= 00 
B = T(q 2, y2) ~ lim y--+ 1 T(q 2, y2) = oo 
y2 ~ 1, establishing (P3). 
Vl 
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